God’s Pregnancy Test: The Law of Non-Contradiction and the Holocaust

With regard to God’s existence, what happens when we apply the law of non-contradiction to the Holocaust?

God is said to be all good and powerful–but the Holocaust happened; therefore if God is good, he’s not all powerful, and if all powerful, not good, for an all good and powerful God would have stopped the Holocaust–unless he had supremely good, overriding, and unavoidable reasons for not doing so.

What might those supremely good, overriding, and unavoidable reasons be?

If one can’t come up with plausible, non-cringe inducing, metaphysical justifications for the Holocaust, there’s good reason to think that God’s existence as both good and all powerful is incoherent–and should be abandoned altogether. As in: this idea must die.

And merely plausible justifications really aren’t enough. As a matter of logic–compelling logic–God cannot be all good and powerful if God had no truly overriding and compelling reasons for allowing–or (gasp) willing!–the Holocaust.

So what are these intellectually and emotionally irresistible, captivating, and spell-binding reasons? What greater good (or goods) was God shooting for that required the Holocaust to happen–and that he simply could not have reached without bringing six million European Jews to collective crucifixion?

(I do hope among those goods was not simply his pleasure and those of his saints in heaven. As flies to wanton boys are we to this god?)

God is either pregnant with supreme goodness and power, or he’s not pregnant. He can’t sort-of be pregnant, or be both pregnant and not pregnant at the same time–and the Holocaust is his pregnancy test.